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Although there are many well-established cyber security tools and techniques 
available to network administrators for managing and defining their systems, attackers 
still succeed in penetrating their systems. Defending these systems’ confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability is the responsibility of network administrators; however, 
protecting these systems becomes more difficult when one considers the volume and 
velocity of data provided by many of these cyber security tools. Often this data may 
actually indicate a cyber-attack, but is hard to discern among the bulk of data provided. 
The purpose of this research is to propose a cyber situational awareness (CSA) model to 
provide network administrators with better situational awareness of cyber security threats 
to their systems. This research examines an established situational awareness model and 
surveys cyber security practices and tools to extend this knowledge to actual cyber 
situational awareness. This research further develops a model for CSA in three 
hierarchical levels: configurational awareness, operational awareness, and special 
conditions awareness. The research concludes that if network administrators manage their 
systems with awareness of these three levels, they would be able to decrease the amount 
of unnecessary data and focus on the most important information that can help them 
better guarantee cyber security of their systems.  
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Vulnerabilities inside cyber systems are of primary interest to cyber attackers 
since every vulnerability opens a new door for a threat to exploit. This is especially true 
for large military or governmental organizations, where these vulnerabilities may result in 
serious risks to critical national security systems.  
Cyber system vulnerabilities may be a result of untrained system users, insider 
threats, or weaknesses in the systems themselves. For example, a user who is not allowed 
to use a flash drive on an organizational computer, but nonetheless uses one without 
knowing what is stored on the flash drive may inadvertently cause malicious software to 
penetrate the network. Alternately, a malicious insider may do essentially the same thing, 
but intentionally and secretly, or may change system settings to create a security 
vulnerability or create even more damage not seen by system administrators. The systems 
themselves are not always designed to correspond to best-known security practices; for 
example, the default configuration that may be appropriate and sufficiently secure for one 
system may on another system disclose information without the knowledge of the system 
administrator. Additionally, installation of new software or hardware on the network 
could cause system vulnerabilities due to incompatibility with system security policies 
implemented by the system administrator.  
When it comes to system security management, threats can be an issue. Although 
there are many tools for identifying threats and vulnerabilities, the data these tools 
provide is often not clear enough for human decision makers to use effectively. As these 
tools may produce large amounts of data, the network administrator must decide what 
data reflect a vulnerability. Furthermore, some vulnerabilities result from routine system 
data or installed software and patches. This task becomes particularly challenging when 
one considers that very critical systems, such as military or governmental systems, must 
be monitored actively to prevent threats from penetrating critical systems or to make the 
administrator aware of unintentional system state changes. For these reasons, maintaining 
active awareness of cyber system configurations and security posture is a critical role for 
cyber system administrators.  
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However, network administrators’ situational awareness capabilities depend on 
their experience, training, and knowledge. Ideally, a real-time training environment can 
provide administrators with the necessary knowledge and experience without affecting 
the real system. For that purpose, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) student Daniel 
McBride designed the Mapping, Awareness, and Virtualization Network Administrator 
Training Tool (MAVNATT) in his 2015 thesis. In this tool, McBride outlined three 
different modules integrated to create a virtual environment for training tactical network 
administrators and monitoring locally deployed systems. The main idea of the awareness 
module is to visualize the network topology and to integrate fault detection capabilities 
within MAVNATT. He stipulated that the awareness module must be able to develop 
network administrators’ situational awareness. He identified existing tools to generate the 
awareness capability; however, these tools were not convenient solutions to implement in 
the virtual training environment (2015). Nonetheless, his thesis showed the importance of 
training to develop network administrators’ situational awareness.  
As previously stated, cyber systems security and maintenance largely depend on 
well-trained network administrators who know how to use their tools and understand 
what is happening in their network systems. That is why these administrators need to be 
trained in real-time virtual environments, such as that provided by MAVNATT. Hence, 
tools, training methods, and best practices should be identified and, where possible, 
incorporated in MAVNATT to provide an environment capable of enhancing network 
administrators’ situational awareness.  
In this context, situational awareness refers to the extent to which one is aware of 
the system’s configuration, operation, and special conditions. Poor system configurations 
may expose vulnerabilities. For this reason, implementing known best practices for 
system configuration generally results in a more secure system. Yet, the best system 
configurations may not be enough to prevent vulnerabilities if an administrator is not 
actively aware of the system’s operation. Administrators must monitor the devices in 
their systems to be sure they are all working as expected. Nonetheless, even though 
everything seems normal, sometimes special conditions may occur in the system state 
that may be difficult for the administrator to detect or interpret. Maybe an attack on the 
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system, either by external or insider operatives, is trying to change something to make the 
system vulnerable to more extensive exploits. Moreover, as the technology develops, 
many other vulnerabilities may become evident in the system. Therefore, the 
administrator’s capability to understand, evaluate, and mitigate vulnerabilities is 
important and needs to be developed, assessed, and exercised.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Although many tools exist to assess vulnerabilities and monitor cyber threat 
activities within tactical networks, network administrators lack the ability to continuously 
maintain cyber situational awareness over these networks, particularly in the context of 
fielded, operational, and time-critical systems.  
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research is to understand cyber situational awareness (CSA) 
with regard to the perspective of network administrators and provide a model for 
enhancing the training methods and contexts for network administrators with respect to 
actively maintaining situational awareness over their systems, particularly against cyber 
threats and vulnerabilities. This research evaluates existing tools and best practices 
pertinent to establishing and maintaining an awareness of network status and operations 
and, based on that evaluation, recommends cyber security methods by which network 
administrators can increase their awareness of network status indicators.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research’s goal is to better understand cyber situational awareness. Therefore, 
these questions will be the main focus of this thesis. 
1. What is cyber situational awareness? 
 What tools are being used for cyber situational awareness? 
 What are the best practices for secure systems? 
 How might cyber situational awareness by modeled so as to guide 
system administrator training and evaluation? 
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2. How can the effectiveness of the network administrator’s situational 
awareness be increased? 
 What tools are needed to enhance the administrator’s awareness? 
 What inhibits the network administrator’s awareness? 
E. RESEARCH METHODS 
This research examines previously published literature, including cyber security 
and awareness reports, surveys, government and enterprise publications, and other 
research papers to discover appropriate best practices, training methods, and tools used 
for maintaining situational awareness of network administrators in the context of cyber 
systems. Best practices may include network training methods, configuration settings, or 
cyber security tools.  
Initially, the research addresses the concept of situational awareness in large 
enterprise networks. The aim is to survey the types of threats and exploitations observed 
by administrators of such networks to better clarify what it means for an administrator to 
be “aware” of his network. To this end, we survey existing situational awareness tools 
and best practices in the cyber security domain to examine how they may support 
administrator awareness of the network.  
Finally, the research identifies tools and techniques that can be used to develop 
the effectiveness of network administrators with respect to finding vulnerabilities and 
threats in tactical networks and make recommendations as to how such tools may be 
adopted or adapted for use by MAVNATT.  
F. POTENTIAL BENEFITS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis is intended to help network administrators gain a better understanding 
of the means and methodology of establishing situational awareness for enhancing 
system security; it will lead to new and better training methods for network 
administrators. With respect to virtual network training environments, the thesis 
recommends a new model for cyber situational awareness that is appropriate for use in 
MAVNATT, as an example of this class of training tool.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
Network administrators face numerous challenges in protecting their systems, 
using tools such as intrusion detection systems, anti-virus applications, or other security 
sensors to defend against adversaries and to mitigate risks. Cyber situational awareness is 
not only related to the effectiveness of these tools in protecting these systems, it is also 
critical to decision makers’ ability to understand network contexts and make good tactical 
decisions (Barford et al., 2010). Many network attacks can be prevented by the 
configuration of firewalls or null-routing, but these tactics are not sufficient against 
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks (Gray, Ritsos, & Roberts, 2015) or insider 
threats. By virtue of being inside the secure perimeter, in possession of valid credentials, 
and having knowledge of the system configurations, insider threats are inherently more 
difficult to identify than outsider threats (Brancik & Ghinita, 2010). Also, existing system 
vulnerabilities that were created by programmers during software or system design, either 
intentionally or not, are a significant industry problem, as they create potential backdoors 
for external attackers. Moreover, most of these security problems are not found until after 
a penetration test or, unfortunately, after an attack on the system (Olama & Nutaro, 
2013).  
Above all, there often exist disconnects between tools and human decision makers 
(Barford et al., 2010). That is to say, tools can track systems and provide logs to network 
administrators, but humans still need to decide on the meaning of the data that those tools 
present (Barford et al., 2010). As new information becomes available, administrators 
must update their systems, and their knowledge, to mitigate their own vulnerabilities 
(Tadda & Salemo, 2010).  
Although there are many tools for identifying threats and vulnerabilities, the data 
they provide is often not clear enough for human decision makers to use effectively. 
These tools may provide large amounts of data, but the network administrator must 
decide which of the data is meaningful, and whether a vulnerability or threat exists. 
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Network administrators’ situational awareness over the network depends on their ability 
to make these analyses, given their experience, training, knowledge, and the tools that 
they use.  
The proficiency of network administrators is dependent on realistic experiences. 
Such experience can be gained in a controlled environment, such as a training lab, or in 
response to events occurring on the networks for which they are responsible. Hence, the 
most effective tools, training methods, and best practices should be identified and, where 
possible, incorporated in an environment capable of enhancing network administrators’ 
situational awareness.  
Limited awareness can have a negative impact on an administrator’s ability to 
precisely see multiple threats or adverse activities in parallel. A failure in situational 
awareness may occur when the measure of information accessible far surpasses an 
administrator’s capacity to process it (Endsley & Connors, 2014).  
The administrator’s ability to maintain awareness of the state of the system is 
critical to the security of the system. Thus, an understanding of what is meant by 
situational awareness in the context of network administration is essential to providing a 
construct for developing and maturing it.  
B. CYBER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS  
Incorporating new computer and networking technologies into an existing 
enterprise means that an organization must be aware of the potential for unexpected 
effects to the current systems, and thus be prepared to respond to such effects by 
accumulating a high level of situational awareness (SA) before and after incorporating 
these changes into the operational network. With increasing cyber threats, any system 
vulnerability may be potentially exploited, which can result in system failures or 
information loss. Therefore, building and maintaining SA at every level of the 
organization is crucial. In particular, administrators of these systems need to be more 
situationally aware than other users, due to their responsibility to securely protect and 
maintain network infrastructure and systems.  
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An essential first step is to define clearly what is meant by cyber situational 
awareness (CSA). This step starts with a review of the basic definition of situational 
awareness. According to Mica R. Endsley’s (1988) definition, “Situational Awareness is 
the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.” As 
one makes sense of this definition, SA is related to the decision-making process, and thus 
to decision makers. Moreover, each individual’s capability to develop SA varies, as each 
interprets the same data in a different way due to his natural capacity to understand the 
data, as well as his education and experience (Endsley, 1995, p. 35). Hence, one can 
expect different individuals to arrive at different decisions given the same situation and 
input. Additionally, the presentation of the data will also doubtlessly affect SA (Endsley, 
1995, p. 50). While SA tools provide data output to help decision makers, these tools do 
not ensure that different decision makers will arrive at the same conclusion. According to 
Endsley (1995), “all system designs are not equal in their ability to convey needed 
information or in the degree to which they are compatible with basic human information-
processing abilities. Other features of the task environment, including workload, stress, 
and complexity, may also affect SA” (p. 35). Thus, many factors can affect the human 
decision-making process and the associated situational awareness, which has led many 
researchers to find novel approaches to help decision makers remain independent of these 
human factors.  
This research uses Endsley’s definitions (1988) as well as his model (1995) to 
reach a clearer understanding of CSA. Endsley (1995) identified three levels of SA: Level 
1 SA: Perception of the Elements in the Environment; Level 2 SA: Comprehension of the 
Current Situation; and Level 3 SA: Projection of Future Status (Endsley, 1995, pp. 36–
37). Endsley’s model depicting the relationships of the different levels is shown in Figure 





Figure 1.  Model of Situational Awareness in Dynamic Decision Making. 
Source: Endsley (1995).  
1. Level 1 SA: Perception of the Elements in the Environment 
According to Endsley (1995), “the first step in achieving SA is to perceive the 
status, attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment” (p. 36). In the 
cyber realm, the core concept of this SA level lies in network administrators 
understanding the basic objectives and elements of the cyber security domain to help 
them overcome false understanding of their systems’ security against cyber-attacks 
(“Cyber Security Elements,” n.d.). The information system security objectives of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (often termed the “CIA triad”) (Ross & 
Swanson, 2004) help to identify conditions necessary to ensure data security; these 
objectives require that organizations and individuals be alert in monitoring 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their data (Henderson, 2015).  
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SA over physical systems is developed with respect to the particular techniques 
and hardware sensors for these systems (Barford et al., 2010). Endsley gives the analogy 
of an aircraft pilot and automobile driver for explaining level 1 SA. According to these 
examples, a pilot perceives mountains with the help of aircraft warning lights, while an 
automobile driver can perceive the location of other vehicles and his car’s current status 
using the automobile’s sensor systems (Endsley, 1995). These physical SA systems have 
slower developing speed than cyber systems (Barford et al., 2010). According to Paul 
Barford et al., “Cyber SA systems rely on cyber sensors such as IDS’, log file sensors, 
anti-virus systems, malware detectors, and firewalls; they all produce events at a higher 
level of abstraction than raw network packets” (2010). These CSA sensors provide the 
necessary information to the administrator, much like the aircraft or automobile warning 
lights in Endsley’s analogies, allowing the administrator to develop an accurate 
perception of the cyber environment.  
In light of the CIA triad, when devising a network security policy, one must be 
aware of the risks posed by system vulnerabilities and related threats to the system, as 
well as possible security countermeasures to mitigate these risks (Paquet, 2013). 
Perception level of awareness covers the cyber sensor’s data. Sensor data warns the 
administrator about the threats and threat indications. These threats may vary from 
malware to insiders, or social engineering to denial of service (DoS) attacks. According 
to a Symantec report, over 430 million new unique malicious programs were discovered 
in 2015, and zero-day vulnerabilities doubled to 54 over the previous year (Symantec, 
2016). This finding reveals that cyber security threats are increasing significantly. Of 
course, knowing about the threats is not enough; an administrator must understand the 
countermeasures that can be employed against them. For example, developing a strict 
patch implementation policy may be a good countermeasure for software security risks, 
while a reliable antivirus detection application and update policy may provide protection 
against known malware.  
Considering the significantly growing numbers of cyber threats and technological 
developments in computer systems, network administrators must strive to achieve level 1 
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cyber SA. They must develop their level 1 SA in order to continuously monitor and 
understand the threat signal data.  
2. Level 2 SA: Comprehension of the Current Situation 
According to Endsley (1995), “Comprehension of the situation is based on a 
synthesis of disjointed Level 1 elements.” Level 2 SA is about understanding the ongoing 
situation and its components by using the knowledge of level 1 SA; moreover, 
interpreting and deciding on it, based on the decision maker’s experience and goals (p. 
37). Endsley illustrates this level from the perspective of an aircraft fighter pilot: “a 
military pilot … must comprehend that the appearance of three enemy aircraft within a 
certain proximity of one another and in a certain geographical location indicates certain 
things about their objectives” (1995). The network administrator can identify the current 
situation by assessing the data derived from tools, logs, and sensors to monitor the state 
of the systems of interest. However, extracting the correct data and identifying the threats 
still may depend on one’s experience and system knowledge since the tools may not 
recognize new motifs, as previous data or practices may not relate to the current situation 
(Tadda & Salemo, 2010, p. 23). This level is not only focused on identifying the threats, 
but also on determining configuration changes, system state changes, or any other 
changes according to the administrator’s goals.  
Properly defined goals will help the network administrator better understand 
information being received, and thus more effectively develop an understanding of the 
emerging situation (Endsley & Connors, 2014). In this way, the administrators develop 
an entire picture of the system, which can aid them in recognizing the events pertinent to 
the system quickly and accurately (Endsley, 1995, p. 37). To illustrate, an unauthorized 
flash drive insertion alarm from a user’s computer does not necessarily indicate an 
attempt to insert malware into the system intentionally; it may simply indicate an 
uninformed user regarding the hazards of using a portable flash drive on his or her 
computer. In another example, friendly-looking emails from an unknown, untrusted 
source may represent an attempted social engineering attack to the system. Above all, the 
decision maker is the person who will interpret indications and data based on his goals.  
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3. Level 3 SA: Projection of Future Status 
Endsley (1995) describes the final SA level as “the ability to project the future 
actions of the elements … achieved through knowledge of the status and dynamics of the 
elements and comprehension of the situation” (p. 37). This level of Endsley’s SA model, 
before the decision maker propagates the decision, is focused on predicting and 
determining the future results of the present case to the running system (Endsley & 
Connors, 2014). Making decisions on possible future results also requires consideration 
of past experiences, and present outcomes of these experiences (Tadda & Salemo, 2010).  
Decision makers must choose the best decision that complies with their purposes 
in this SA level (Endsley, 1995). Endsley gives another real-world example to 
demonstrate this: “an air traffic controller needs to put together information on various 
traffic patterns to determine which runaways will be free, and where there is a potential 
for collisions” (p. 37). The predictions made at this level are crucial for CSA because the 
correct evaluation of network events may prevent future cyber-attacks. For example, an 
attack may be a deception in support of another attack that may bring less indication or 
warning but carry more effect to the system; or the residuals of this attack may damage 
the running system over an extended period of time. A clear prediction of potential future 
impacts may lead the administrator to clean residuals from the operating system or 
identify new avenues of attack. Therefore, the decision makers responsible for critical 
and complex systems must have a clear sense of their system objectives rather than 
simply observe the state of the current situation without an understanding of the impact of 
such states (Endsley, 1995).  
C. MAVNATT 
MAVNATT was designed to fill gaps in network administrator training for 
support to United States Marine Corps tactical networks (McBride, 2015). The goal of 
the system was to provide a lightweight tool to train network administrators by 
replicating a tactical network with a virtual network environment. This virtualized 
environment is intended to replicate the real network to allow administrator training in 
system implementation, maintenance, and security, since training on the real network 
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may cause unexpected or detrimental results to that network. If something unacceptable 
happens in the virtualized environment, it will not impact the mission and does not 
damage the original network. Moreover, this kind of training may increase the practical 
experience level of the supported network administrators.  
As mentioned in Chapter I, McBride (2015) defined three essential modules 
comprising the MAVNATT framework and architecture (see Figure 2): mapping, 
awareness, and virtualization. The framework’s goal was to integrate these three modules 
(McBride, 2015) to allow replication of a real operational network in a virtual network 
environment.  
The MAVNATT framework includes a graphical user interface (GUI) to provide 
situation awareness for the administrator. This interface provides novice administrators 
with better SA over a real network and virtualized network, as well as providing for 
training schema and monitoring of network issues (McBride, 2015).  
 
Figure 2.  MAVNATT Conceptual Model. Source: McBride (2015).  
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The MAVNATT GUI must be suitable for showing the real and the virtualized 
network topologies and easy to learn for users (McBride, 2015). In the MAVNATT 
technology demonstration, the simplicity of a GUI was able to increase the situational 
awareness of network administrators, especially for novice users compared to 
experienced users; novice users need more training due to their lower level of expertise.  
As currently defined, the MAVNATT awareness module mostly emphasizes 
device status within the networks. If a system error happens in a real system, the network 
administrator must be able to see the same error in the virtual training network. This may 
help the network administrator work on real network system flaws (McBride, 2015). So, 
this benefits the system security posture by developing network administrator skills 
against unexpected situations without harming the mission system. Also, MAVNATT can 
allow administrators to resolve faults using the virtualized systems or to verify the impact 
of configuration setting changes, and then apply the solution to the respective real 
network systems after they have been fully tested in a virtualized environment.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter describes cyber situational awareness and its importance to decision-
makers and administrators responsible for critical cyber systems. It further described the 
purpose of MAVNATT and its awareness module in the context of CSA. By having an 
understanding of how CSA is established and maintained, developing a methodology for 
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III. SURVEY OF NETWORK AWARENESS TOOLS AND 
TECHNIQUES  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, cyber situational awareness is a challenging 
and complex task for human beings. The cyber domain encompasses many components 
and its events occur very rapidly, making it difficult for the human mind to comprehend; 
further, events in cyber space may happen in rapid succession. Thus, if an administrator 
does not have the proper tools and techniques to help protect the cyber system for which 
he or she is responsible for maintaining and protecting, then successfully accomplishing 
these tasks is difficult. Furthermore, a lack of appropriate security measures leaves the 
operating system virtually defenseless against threats. For these reasons, many cyber 
security professionals maintain a set of security tools, technologies, sources, reports, 
techniques, and best practices to aid them in securing their cyber systems and 
environment (Albanese & Jajodia, 2014).  
According to Massimiliano Albanese and Sushil Jajodia, a powerful cyber 
defense framework requires these important functions: 
 Learning from attacks 
 Prioritization 
 Metrics 
 Continuous diagnostic and mitigation 
 Automation (2014) 
Therefore, in this thesis, we consider that people are the ultimate decision makers 
of automated cyber systems, since they control checking, verifying, and reviewing the 
results of automated tools (Albanese & Jajodia, 2014). Rather than focus on protocols 
related to network management in this chapter, we explore some of the critical security 
solutions related to network administrator techniques and tools to provide a clearer view 
of CSA.  
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A. NETWORK SECURITY AND AWARENESS TECHNIQUES  
Creating a network requires the physical and logical connection of devices. 
However, without the correct configuration of devices, physical connections are not 
enough to build a functioning network, let alone a well-designed and secure network. In 
fact, there is no perfect cyber system such that its devices work well together forever after 
initially configuring them. As the network’s subsystems, computers, technologies, and 
software evolve and change, the devices may give errors or their current state may 
change unexpectedly due to device failure or external action. In addition to changes in 
device status, attackers may exploit vulnerabilities in misconfigured devices to 
compromise them until the entire network is eventually compromised. Moreover, if the 
network operator does not understand what is occurring within a system, or 
underestimates state changes, the results to the network as a whole may become 
catastrophic. Further, as the network grows, managing it becomes an increasingly 
challenging task (McCloghrie & Sanchez, 2001). Therefore, the network’s configuration 
is a critical process which one must always bear in mind.  
Management of system configurations is an information technology (IT) area 
referred to as network configuration management. It is a broad part of network 
management (“Network Configuration Management,” n.d.) and according to 
Techopedia.com it is defined as 
a broad term for the organization and management of a computer network. 
All sorts of networks, including local area networks, wireless networks 
and virtual networks all need elements of maintenance, modification, 
repair and general monitoring. Network configuration management 
involves collecting different information about hardware devices, software 
programs and other elements of the network in order to support 
administration and troubleshooting. (2016) 
This research argues that configuration management can be the first phase of 
CSA. As discussed in the previous chapter, the first level of SA is “Perception of 
Elements in Current Situation” (Endsley, 1995). In a cyber network, accurately managing 
the configuration of the network requires putting together all the pieces of the system to 
get instantaneous information on the running devices and their current status.  
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This section covers network security practices for configurations and awareness 
of Department of Defense (DOD) systems. In the realm of configuration, there are 
numerous guidelines for configuring systems for computer security best practices, such as 
Defense Information Agency (DISA)’s Security Technical Implementation Guides, U. S. 
Government Configuration Baseline, and Center for Internet Security Standards (Byrne, 
2015). This thesis discusses only STIGs, since DOD is following this guidance for their 
cyber systems security. Router access configuration lists are covered as well.  
1. Access Control Lists 
Access controls lists (ACL) are sets of router-based network traffic filtering rules 
that provide additional security to networks. ACLs allow a router powerful control over 
network packets. The router checks inbound and outbound traffic packet headers 
according to the ACLs; if there was an ACL rule defined for a specific packet, the router 
decides to permit or deny the actual packet with regard to this rule.  
One can create ACLs directly on the router via the command line. For a specific 
ACL, there will often be more than one rule assigned to that ACL name. On some 
routers, after assigning rules to an ACL, it is not possible to delete individual rules 
without deleting the ACL (“Cisco IOS Security Configuration Guide,” n.d.). After 
creating the ACL, one can apply it to the router interfaces based on the interface’s 
connected network; otherwise, the ACL does not run and merely stays in the router’s 
memory.  
The order of rules in an ACL is crucial, as the router checks the statements line by 
line against an incoming packet until a corresponding rule is matched. When the router 
matches a rule with the packet, it decides to permit or deny the packet based on the rule, 
and then does not check any remaining rules (“Cisco IOS Security Configuration Guide,” 
n.d.). For instance, if one of the interfaces of the router connects the organization’s web 
server to the network, this interface’s ACLs can have rules to permit forwarding of 
incoming traffic (e.g., allowing incoming connections to port 80) and deny all other 
inbound packets to that server. This idea is demonstrated by the following example: 
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access-list sampleRule permit tcp 20.3. 9.0 0.0. 0.255 any eq 80 
access-list sampleRule deny ip any any 
Ordering of rules is also critical with regard to rule types. For example, if a 
network administrator defined permit rules after the deny rules, no traffic could access a 
web server. Although this is a very simple example of misconfiguration, and one that can 
easily be detected and fixed, there might be more complex ACLs where errors in 
configuration could cause serious network traffic degradation or failure. Detection of 
such errors may take significant time. Due to human error in ACL configurations, the 
system state can become invalid; moreover, these systems may become vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks. According to Nancy Navato (2001), these errors are “failure to create and 
add access list entries in the correct sequence,” “failure to apply the access list to an 
interface in the correct direction,” and “failure to apply the access list to an interface.” 
Hence, network administrators should be careful when creating ACLs. After creating 
ACL lists, network administrators must also on occasion review them to ensure the ACL 
lists are still current (Navato, 2001).  
2. Security Technical Implementation Guides  
Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIG) are configuration documents 
that explain how to configure various computing and network devices to mitigate security 
risks (Byrne, 2015). According to the DISA webpage, “STIGs contain technical guidance 
to ‘lock down’ information systems/software that might otherwise be vulnerable to a 
malicious computer attack” (“STIGs Home,” n.d.). DISA has defined more than 400 
STIGs for different types and versions of software and systems. The DISA STIGs 
website allows the public to download STIG zip files, where one zip file may contain pdf 
archives and a STIG folder, or it may contain only a STIG file. These pdf archives can 
give unclassified information about the overview of the downloaded STIG, its revision 
history, and Security Requirements Guides about the technology related to the STIG. 
Every STIG is categorized according to the DISA guidelines shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Vulnerability Severity Category Code Definitions.  
Source: “STIGs Home” (n.d.). 
DISA Category Code Guidelines 
CAT I Any vulnerability, the exploitation of which will directly and 
immediately result in loss of Confidentiality, Availability, or Integrity.  
CAT II Any vulnerability, the exploitation of which has a potential result in loss 
of Confidentiality, Availability, or Integrity.  
CAT III Any vulnerability, the exploitation of which degrades measures to 
protect against loss of Confidentiality, Availability, or Integrity.  
 
Additionally, most STIGs are in Extensible Markup Language (XML) format, for 
which DISA has a useful STIG Viewer java tool that allows viewing of STIG files more 
easily. This tool has the ability to show more than one STIG, as well as to filter responses 
according to severity categories or keywords. An example of this is shown in Figure 3, 
where this research imported Apple iOS 10, Microsoft Word 2013, Application Layer 
Gateway, and Apache Server 2.2 technical guides to the DISA STIG Viewer.  
  
Figure 3.  DISA STIG Viewer 
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Although STIGs are prepared to secure DOD infrastructure, anyone can freely 
access and implement these policies for the own organization. However, before changing 
any software configuration, one should take into consideration that the updated security 
settings of one application may affect other applications’ security settings or state. 
Therefore, network administrators are responsible for adapting the STIG guides to their 
systems by considering the effects of the policies. Such adaptation requires significant 
understanding of the system for which the administrator is responsible, an understanding 
only developed through significant practice and operational experience.  
3. System Logs 
According to Karen Kent and Murugiah P. Souppaya (2006), a log is “a record of 
the events occurring within an organization’s system and networks” (p. 2–1). Logs may 
pertain to hardware devices, software, services, databases, or operating systems. Logging 
mechanisms can serve as a feedback mechanism to generate positive information about 
the state of the system; they can also serve as an alert system to inform the network 
operators regarding a critical situation. Oftentimes, being notified of and analyzing the 
errors on a system, or getting real-time information about running software, may not be 
possible without continuous logging mechanisms in place on that system.  
Furthermore, the requirements of network management make logging inevitable. 
Routine log surveys and examination are essential for recognizing network problems, 
security incidents, policy abuses, and criminal activity after they have happened (Kent & 
Souppaya, 2006). Different systems may use different vendor-based logging formats; 
therefore, in order to review all logs in human readable format, organizations usually 
require changing the various logs into a common format (Kent & Souppaya, 2006). In 
these circumstances, log management tools can help to eliminate different formats and 
show human readable logs to the network administrators.  
Also, logging can provide information to identify unauthorized data breaches. For 
example, an organization creating web applications for its departments might use the real 
databases rather than test databases for software test and development purposes, giving 
database access permission to their software programmers. In that situation, database 
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query logs can show how the software developers are engaging with the database, and 
who among them may be abusing their authority on the system as a potential insider 
threat.  
B. NETWORK AWARENESS TOOLS 
Considering the volume and velocity of network traffic in modern cyber systems, 
administrators of these systems must rely on sensor data to develop CSA, as described in 
Chapter II. Using tools that can provide more actionable and human readable data to 
network administrators is very important. There are many network monitoring and 
assessment tools available commercially, with varying prices and capabilities. It is not 
possible to evaluate all of these tools in this research; therefore, this research describes 
some of the configuration and cyber security tools that relate to and support CSA.  
1. Firewalls
A firewall is a network security device or a host-based application that monitors 
network traffic flow, then blocks or filters incoming and outgoing traffic (packets) 
according to predefined filtering rules (West, Dean, & Andrews, 2015, p. 405). For 
instance, the Windows operating system comes with an integrated host-based Windows 
Firewall. Furthermore, anti-malware tools may also contain a firewall that is integrated 
within the application. Those are examples of host-based firewalls that protect the 
personal computers or servers on which they are loaded.  
Protecting the entire network, however, requires network-based firewalls. These 
firewalls are installed at the entrance to the network as a course filter to protect the 
network from any externally-induced malicious network behavior. Routers are one 
example of network-based firewalls since they have the ability to perform packet filtering 
(Northrup, n.d.). Although network firewalls may come preconfigured to prevent most 
common typical security threats, network administrators may customize the 
firewall settings in accordance with their network needs (West et al., 2015, p. 406).  
Packet filtering is not the only benefit of network-based firewalls. There are 
different firewalls that have functionality to strengthen network security, such as logging, 
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encryption, and user authentication (West et al., 2015, p. 407). Since firewalls do not 
block all malicious traffic on a network, a logging capability can help the network 
administrators develop CSA; for example, logs may be reviewed after a security breach 
to analyze the attacker’s behaviors or to get a clearer view of how the attacker managed 
to pass the firewall to gain access to the system (Northrup, n.d.). This data may help 
network administrators to change security configurations by adding new rule sets to the 
firewall settings.  
2. Intrusion Detection Systems 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a software or hardware device that 
monitors network traffic and produces alerts when a potential network security incident 
occurs (West et al., 2015, p. 402). The main goal of an IDS is to recognize potential 
network security events (Scarfone & Mell, 2007). Accordingly, an IDS has nothing to do 
with prevention of an intrusion, but rather it raises alerts and logs the detection of an 
intrusion. Thus, an IDS provides necessary information to the network administrator by 
logging all probable incidents, allowing the administrator to take actions to mitigate the 
effects of the potential attack (Scarfone & Mell, 2007).  
IDS systems work like a network sniffer, capturing and analyzing packets as they 
traverse the network. Understanding the security incidents from the captured network 
traffic requires extra effort, as well as practice, for a security analyst. However, an IDS 
not only captures the network traffic, it can examine the traffic from the standpoint of 
network security (Snyder, 2009). Therefore, IDSs can be tailored to adopt various 
techniques to detect the security issues. An IDS can be configured to utilize several 
different methods of detection, such as signature-based or anomaly-based, or through 
stateful protocol analysis (Scarfone & Mell, 2007).  
Signature-based detection uses the same approach to detection as anti-virus 
software, so that the IDS compares captured traffic to samples in its database and 
attempts to match the known attack vectors with the observed network packets (Bradley, 
2016). However, this approach may be inefficient against any unknown or new security 
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threats, such as zero-day attacks, whose presence is hidden until the intended “release 
date.”  
Anomaly-based detection is a very powerful method to help administrators 
become aware of any new kind of attacks. Anomaly-based IDSs observe the network 
over time to create a characterization of the network’s “normal” behavior. Then they 
compare the learned behavior with the current state of the network to find significant 
changes or anomalies in traffic patterns and characteristics (Scarfone & Mell, 2007).  
Stateful protocol analysis is an entirely different approach that depends on IDS 
vendor-specific configurations as to how the exact protocols should behave in the system 
(Scarfone & Mell, 2007). For instance, according to this method the IDS may alert any 
connection to port 4444; because Metasploit, a common hacking tool, often uses port 
4444 as a default, it is highly likely that the IDS system will detect and alert this action as 
potential exploitation or malicious activity. Moreover, network administrators can also 
create their personal security rules according to their network protection concerns 
regarding their cyber environments.  
In addition to the detection methodologies discussed earlier, there are two 
categories of IDSs: host-based (HIDS) and network-based (NIDS). As one can assume 
from its name, HIDS operates on a single machine in order to protect that system. Most 
probably, this machine is a critical server for the organization, so one may need to 
analyze significant security incidents occurring on that server by looking at that 
machine’s HIDS logs. NIDS, conversely, protect a network by running on a critical edge 
of the network so it can monitor all incoming and outgoing traffic (Bradley, 2016), as 
well as traffic internal to the network. However, placing only one NIDS for an extensive 
network may have undesirable side effects for the network. To illustrate, if the 
monitoring capacity of the NIDS is lower than the flowing traffic, it may miss important 
security issues; so, it may not alert for all detectable events. Eventually, this kind of 
installation on a large capacity network may leave the system vulnerable because it does 
not provide enough data to the network administrator. Therefore, one should use more 
than one NIDS in series, as necessary, on a larger-scale network. For example, if the 
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system consists of a wireless network with a demilitarized zone, installing two different 
NIDSs for each of those networks may increase the network monitoring capacity.  
3. Intrusion Prevention Systems 
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) are powerful tools in that they not only have 
the ability to operate with the same logic as IDSs, but also can prevent intrusion incidents 
from happening. There are different types of IPSs with different capabilities to prevent 
attacks. With respect to these capabilities, an IPS can prevent attacks by ending a 
connection or user session, changing the security configurations of the system, or 
changing malicious content (Scarfone & Mell, 2007). For example, an IPS can scan 
incoming emails and remove any malicious attachment, then permit the email to reach its 
receiver without the harmful attachment (Scarfone & Mell, 2007).  
System administrators can use IPSs in conjunction with IDSs. This decision 
depends on the organization’s network security policies. However, IPSs may provide 
robust security tools for the network security. Due to their capability for prevention, they 
make it less difficult for the network administrators to secure their systems. Obviously, 
some threats may pass through the systems’ prevention mechanisms; however, reducing 
the number of threats inside the system can help network administrators concentrate on 
the security issues that exist within the network.  
4. Anti-Virus Software 
Anti-virus (AV) or anti-malware software can protect systems against malicious 
software by using signature- or behavior-based database definition comparisons. Anti-
virus software has a predominant role in the protection of organizational networks. Even 
though they do not have the ability to find malware that does not contain a signature 
present in their database, AV systems can prevent critical known security issues that may 
occur on a host. For instance, an end-user who does not know basic computer security 
may insert a flash drive that contains malware into the organization’s computer that does 
not have any anti-virus protection, which may result in that malware spreading through 
the system. However, if the system had host-based AV software installed, it could detect 
and eradicate the virus.  
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There are many kinds of AV software available with different features. For this 
reason, network security administrators should carefully choose the proper software for 
own organizational needs. According to Jill West et al., (2015), AV software should have 
at least these capabilities: 
 Detect malware through signature scanning 
 Detect malware through integrity checking 
 Detect malware by monitoring unexpected file changes or virus-like 
behaviors 
 Receive regular updates and modifications 
 Consistently report only valid instances of malware (p. 418) 
All of those features can help make the system more secure against malware. Still, 
end-user awareness plays a major role in malware protection. For instance, an attacker 
can conduct a social engineering attack on the organization’s employees by sending 
brand-new malware as an attractive email attachment. Accordingly, even the best 
signature-based AV software cannot detect this malware. Even if only one person opens 
that attachment, the network administrator’s efforts to secure the network go for naught.  
5. Nagios XI 
Nagios XI is a Linux-based tool that contains many features benefiting IT 
infrastructure and managers by monitoring necessary elements of the network. Robust 
dashboards give initial access to observe the data effectively. Users can customize the 
layout, preferences, and design according to personal choice (“Nagios XI,” 2016). To 
increase awareness, Nagios XI may send outage details via email or mobile alerts to the 
responsible personnel so that they can solve the problem at once (“Nagios XI,” 2016). 
Figure 4 shows one of the Nagios XI features, an example of a network replay report, 
which shows the network devices’ status over time. The interactive nodes in this figure 
allow the network administrator to understand the historical status of each device 
(“Nagios XI,” n.d.).  
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Figure 4.  Nagios XI Infrastructure Management Feature, Example of Network 
Replay Report. Source: “Nagios XI” (2016). 
Nagios XI also has a powerful monitoring engine that allows users active and 
extended monitoring. Also, the tool has a web interface and provides advanced graphs to 
increase user visibility into the system state. Specifically for convenient configuration of 
the network devices, Nagios XI provides Configuration Wizards to easily set up devices, 
services, databases and so on (“Nagios XI,” 2016).  
6. NetCrunch 
NetCrunch is a high capacity network-monitoring tool that is able to detect 
network devices automatically, identify the device type, or find out whether the device 
supports SNMP, Simple Network Management Protocol (NetCrunch, n.d.). Accordingly, 
NetCrunch can automatically build routing, logical network, and Data Link Layer (Layer 
2) maps (NetCrunch, n.d.). For managing network devices, NetCrunch uses SNMP 
(NetCrunch, n.d.). NetCrunch also has many capabilities, such as traffic monitoring from 
different flow sources, log monitoring, hardware and software inventory by which the 
software can show data about installed patches, and alerting abilities (NetCrunch, n.d.). 
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NetCrunch can run 56 previously defined actions on remote hosts, such as rebooting 
machines or restarting services (NetCrunch, n.d.). This program also uses an alert 
notification system via email or text messages (NetCrunch, n.d.). Correspondingly, it 
shows current alerts in the “Pending Alerts View” screen so as to draw the attention of 
the users to present network problems rather than having to look through the event logs 
only (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5.  NetCrunch Pending Alerts View, Example Display. Source: 
“NetCrunch” (n.d.). 
7. Solaris Network Performance Monitor 
Solaris Network Performance Monitor (NPM) is a Windows-based network 
monitoring and management software product. It has powerful features that may help 
network administrators increase their situational awareness of the network devices. 
According to Solaris NPM website, some of the features of the software are: 
 Customizable topology and dependency-aware intelligent alerts 
 Dynamic wired and wireless network discovery and mapping 
 Automated capacity forecasting alerting, and reporting 
 Wireless network monitoring and management 
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 Consultant-and services-free deployment 
 Customizable single-pane-of-glass network monitoring software 
 Hardware health monitoring and alerting 
 Customizable performance and availability reports 
 Dynamic statistical network performance baselines (“SolarWinds,” n.d.) 
Monitoring different kinds of devices with the help of these abilities, a network 
administrator may have sufficient information about the current situation of the network 
to respond quickly to network troubles that arises.  
Also, as shown in Figure 6, the ability to group network nodes by vendor can 
provide further information to the administrator as to whether the detected problem that 
requires attention might be a product-based issue (“SolarWinds,” n.d.). To illustrate, if one 
of a vendor’s products starts to send more errors, this may be the result of a vulnerability or 
the result of a vendor-released patch that is not compatible with the system.  
 
Figure 6.  Solaris NPM Network Availability and Performance Monitoring 
Screenshot. Source: “SolarWinds” (n.d.). 
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8. Host Based Security System 
The Host Based Security System (HBSS) is a DOD program. According to Mike 
Gawlas (2009), the main goal of this program is “to provide network administrators and 
security personnel with mechanisms to prevent, detect, track, report and remediate 
malicious computer-related activities and incidents across all Defense Department 
networks and information systems” (Gawlas, 2009). Thus, HBSS can enhance CSA of 
DOD systems by strengthening its command and control over the associated cyber 
systems (Boland, 2012).  
HBSS is a combination of the network and host based security systems employed 
by the DOD for each host on the controlled networks (Boland, 2012). The system has the 
ability to allow the use of only authorized software and devices on the network in 
accordance with the predefined rules (Gawlas, 2009). HBSS has many capabilities to 
maintain host security, such as the ability to check a host’s behavior by comparing the 
common behaviors of the host with the current authorized behavior so that the system 
generates an alert regarding an unexpected activity (Newth, 2016).  
C. SUMMARY 
The goal of this chapter was to develop an understanding of the types of tools and 
techniques necessary and available to build and maintain secure networks. Herein it was 
discussed that all of the cyber security techniques and tools presented are helpful to 
protect the associated networks and devices, as well as to develop CSA. Better CSA 
serves to strengthen the security of the cyber systems. The next chapter proposes a design 
model for network administrators to develop and maintain CSA using the tools and 
techniques presented in this chapter.  
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IV. CYBER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS MODEL DESIGN 
Access to data is becoming more and more digitalized, however, the rapid 
increase in volume of digital information used by commercial and government 
enterprises has necessitated new, more robust, and powerful information systems to store, 
process, and analyze this data. Hard disks, software, computer processors, and other 
computer technologies are growing rapidly in order to handle and store all this emerging 
data. New technologies and systems continue to appear, such as cyber-rich networks, 
cloud environments, the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, and so on. As users’ 
data requirements grow more complex, they demand information-dependent technologies 
that are interdependent with one other. At the same time, this growth in data systems 
technology is also placing greater demands on security to protect the valuable data within 
these systems. The transportation, maintenance, and protection of such data require 
significant resources. Automation processes and tools are being leveraged by enterprises 
to address these requirements by using similar information technologies to analyze the 
data of interest. However, the complexity of the automation processes themselves also 
produces more raw data to be assessed by human decision makers, inevitably adding to 
the complexity of the network administrator’s role. It is critical that enterprises have 
complete and accurate situational awareness of their systems to support to proper 
decision making.  
As discussed in Chapter II, CSA is of crucial importance to securing cyber 
systems. Most CSA tools help cyber security professionals by initiating alerts, warning 
messages, and log entries, while some tools, like IPSs, protect the systems themselves 
against cyber threats. However, security reports such as Symantec’s 2016 Internet 
Security Threat Report show that security threats are not decreasing with respect to the 
bulk of the tools. Instead, the number of threats is significantly increasing.  
Oftentimes, an expert cyber security professional is effectively a novice user 
when a new technology is introduced. Developing CSA by utilizing tools remains limited 
without enhancing human understanding. This requires users to continuously cultivate 
and maintain CSA.  
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Making decisions based on sensor data is necessary to protect cyber systems; 
however, this is not always sufficient. Since a cyber system may consist of many entities, 
focusing on it as only one entity is not sufficient. Yet, the complexity of the integrated 
cyber systems within a network does not lend itself to discussion that treats each 
component separately. Accordingly, understanding a complex system by dividing it into 
its hierarchical elements might yield more timely and accurate decisions. Therefore, to 
develop better CSA of cyber networks and systems, one should start by understanding 
them from end-to-end by developing a new CSA model.  
A. CYBER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS PYRAMID 
Considering the importance of CSA with respect to the decision-making process, 
it is clear that it should be analyzed from multiple, hierarchical perspectives regarding 
cyber security. Just as dividing systems into different components reduces their 
complexity, using an incremental approach to CSA may help to reduce the logical 
complexity of the cyber systems of interest, thus improving our understanding of these 
components parts and contributing to improved CSA.  
We define CSA as being composed of configurational awareness, operational 
awareness, and special conditions awareness. If one can clearly identify and implement 
the goals of each of these parts of a cyber system, one can approach absolute awareness 
of cyber security. The component parts of CSA are hierarchical in their nature, and can 
be envisioned as a pyramid, as shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7.  Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA) Pyramid. 
As each level of the pyramid is accomplished well, the administrator’s CSA 
increases, reducing the logical complexity of the system. This then allows the decision 
maker to focus on the next level. Finally, reaching the top level, the administrator may 
achieve maximum CSA of the system. Without achieving the lower levels, it is not 
possible to develop CSA at the next level. When a lower level has unresolved problems 
associated with it, the administrator will be unable to identify or resolve problems 
associated with the next level.  
1. Configurational Awareness  
Configurational awareness (CA) is the base of the CSA pyramid; it represents the 
reality that the configuration is the foundation of information system security. Without a 
proper configuration policy, maintaining secure and reliable cyber systems would not be 
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possible. Building better configuration management of a system reduces the security risks 
to that system.  
As discussed earlier, CSA depends on the data that sensors produce continuously. 
Sensors tend to produce more data in a poorly configured system than they do in a well 
configured one; for example, a system without a proper configuration easily becomes 
vulnerable. This tends to increase false positive sensor data, such as with IDSs, which can 
lead administrators to make poor decisions as they could miss critical valid data due to 
the complexity and chaos of the information being received. Eventually, this overload of 
invalid data due to poor system configuration results in the administrator’s CSA 
decreasing dramatically. However, in a converse scenario, an administrator of a well-
configured system does not have to cope with configuration-related data. When the 
system is properly configured according to best practices, the administrator is able to 
focus on the operational level of awareness because the system’s configuration generates 
less distracting invalid sensor data. Thus, it is easier for the network administrator to 
comprehend the activity of the network associated with operations. 
Sometimes well-configured networks can also have problems caused by human 
errors introduced to the configuration process. The solution to this problem is to monitor 
the system configuration by implementing network configuration management tools. 
These tools not only provide necessary information about the system configuration but 
also help to configure all of the network devices, thus enabling administrators to focus on 
the upper levels of the CSA pyramid. 
2. Operational Awareness 
Cyber security must continuously identify each threat, block each threat, and then 
address the vulnerability that is the root cause of the risk associated with the threat. In the 
operational awareness (OA) level of CSA, cyber security tools help to identify threats to 
the system. Tools such as IDS, firewalls, or anti-virus software provide operational 
warnings and log entries while the system is in operation. Threats identified by such tools 
help the administrator eliminate and block these threats. The administrator may do this by 
deleting malicious software, blocking an IP address, or changing the configuration of the 
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system. This threat detection and prevention is a continuing process, depending on the 
emergence of threat during the system’s operation. 
As described in the CA component of CSA pyramid, administrators of a well-
configured system can more effectively focus on the most critical issues in OA. 
Automation plays a critical role in accomplishing this in OA. Correctly configured IPSs, 
or other cyber security automation tools, may do a significant portion of the job without 
human interaction. So, the administrator can focus on more relevant and critical sensor 
data to analyze it in terms of cyber security. Thus, automation helps to decrease the 
amount of unnecessary data requiring manual inspection. Though these tools may come 
with a default set of configurations, they still require custom configuration with respect to 
the system they support and for expected or emerging threat patterns. Eventually, a 
proper and accurate configuration of these tools enhances system security by supporting 
the administrator’s OA.  
3. Special Conditions Awareness 
The CA and OA components of CSA focus primarily on administrator level CSA. 
One should not neglect, however, the user level of awareness as being critical to overall 
CSA; this user level is captured by special conditions awareness (SCA). SCA is the 
uppermost level of the CSA pyramid, as without CA and OA the network administrator 
may not be able to detect risk behaviors by system users, such as inserting 
unauthenticated removable media into system devices or attempting to install suspicious 
and unnecessary software. Even correctly configured and protected systems might be 
compromised if this level of CSA is not achieved.  
It is not possible to define all of the special conditions that might expose a cyber 
system to attacks or persistent threats because, as the systems evolve, new threats may 
appear. Even the best cyber security tools that focus on CA and OA may not be able to 
identify all types of threats that may appear to the user system; thus, there is no absolute 
cyber security level achieved without developing and maintaining user level CSA. To 
illustrate this point, consider a secure network in which security tools and techniques are 
employed to protect its perimeter. Even a system like this may not be entirely secure, as 
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human users are utilizing the system. An aggressive, well-structured phishing attack may 
result in even a trained user dropping his guard and releasing information to the attacker 
that could result in system compromise.  
Curiosity, desires, and other behaviors associated with human nature make cyber 
systems vulnerable to insider threats. However, if users with higher CSA realize 
something is happening within their cyber environment and report suspicious activity to 
the administrators, these users can make a real difference in the overall security of the 
system. So, even non-expert users receiving security-related training and experience is as 
vital as properly trained system administrators.  
B. SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented a model of cyber situational awareness based on a 
pyramid concept of interrelated levels of SA for cyber systems and the networks that they 
protect. The model suggests that three hierarchical levels of SA contribute to developing 
better CSA. The model divides CSA into three distinct levels to better understand, 
maintain, and improve awareness over networked systems. These levels are 
configurational awareness, operational awareness, and special conditions awareness. 
Without achieving awareness at the lowest level of the model, the administrator will have 
difficulty improving the upper levels of awareness. Therefore, these levels of awareness 
must be achieved from the bottom up to affect the network administrator’s CSA. 
Achieving all levels of the CSA pyramid directly supports the goal of achieving absolute 






V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to understand cyber situational awareness with 
regard to the perspective of network administrators, to help shed light on the 
requirements of training for cyber security professionals. The research argued that 
improving administrators’ CSA may help to better secure cyber systems. Continuous 
monitoring of cyber systems is critical to achieving that goal. To this end, administrators 
benefit from informed, experienced use of available network tools and best practices and 
techniques.  
To promote the understanding of CSA, this research first discussed the concepts 
of situational awareness as they pertain to management and use of cyber systems. Next, 
the research surveyed some of the tools and techniques pertinent to generating CSA. 
Finally, the research proposed a CSA development model in order to guide the 
establishment and maintenance of effective CSA of network administrators and users 
whose principal responsibility is the operation of cyber systems. 
There are many cyber security and network monitoring tools available, each with 
many different features. Some enhance cyber system oversight by automatically detecting 
or preventing external attacks and reducing the number of threats to reach the inside of 
the systems. Still, these do not provide enough protection against novel threats, which are 
the most dangerous ones. Such threats require human analysis of the sensor data. 
Additionally, cyber security and network monitoring tools may produce significant 
volumes of data, potentially more than the human brain can effectively comprehend. The 
velocity of the data also makes it more difficult to maintain awareness of the critical 
cyber security data inherent in a complex system with complex data.  
The research aimed to decrease this complexity by proposing the CSA pyramid. 
This pyramid consists of three levels, depicting a hierarchy of addressing security threats: 
configurational awareness, operational awareness, and special conditions awareness. 
These levels of awareness, addressed from bottom to top, seek to improve system 
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administrators’ CSA. The ultimate goal of this model is to support the achievement of 
absolute cyber security through human interaction with proper security tools and 
techniques. Also, the research concludes that administrator CSA is not enough for 
absolute security; system user CSA also must be supported by the model. This result 
shows that continued user training is as critical to system security as is network 
administrator training.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
The research benefits the MAVNATT awareness module by defining CSA and a 
model that may guide the development of both administrator and user CSA. MAVNATT 
does not currently have an awareness module implemented. Additional research may 
build this module for MAVNATT by employing the proposed CSA model. 
Using machine learning to automate threat protection processes may help to 
develop a more secure cyber system by enabling administrators to focus may effectively 
on the higher levels of CSA. Conducting research to implement machine-learning 
algorithms as new tools for the generation of CSA may improve the cyber security of 
systems of interest. Further, artificial intelligence is a powerful concept in information 
technology. Therefore, new research should look into how to use artificial intelligence to 
develop CSA. 
Human interaction with cyber systems is not making networks and their 
components safer. User activities, such as unwittingly opening email attachments or 
using flash drives containing malware, are some of the causes of cyber-attacks. Reducing 
human interaction by implementing virtual systems, such as that envisioned by 
MAVNATT, may reduce risks introduced by system users. Therefore, host-based 
systems that examine the data in a virtual environment before opening it in the real 
environment may reduce the security risks by increasing the user’s understanding of the 
potentially catastrophic effects of poor cyber situational unawareness. Research into this 
area can make a real difference in overall network security. 
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CSA training is becoming compulsory in many critical organizations. Research 
about how to test the effectiveness of this training may help to improve current training 
methods. 
Information technology is significantly evolving as discussed in this research. The 
Internet of Things (IoT) is an example of this evolving technology. As IoT poses 
increasing vunerabilities to established systems by presenting new vectors of exposure, 
the security of IoT also presents increased cyber security concerns; it poses new 
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